The Framework for Various Approaches and the New Market Mechanism.  CEPS Special Report No. 90, 3 October 2014 by Marcu, Andrei
 Andrei Marcu is Senior Advisor and Head of the CEPS Carbon Market Forum. This paper was 
originally prepared as a submission to the 40th session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice, 19 September 2014. 
The CEPS Carbon Market Forum was established in 2012 
with the aim of creating a neutral space where policy-
makers and regulators are able to meet carbon market 
participants and other stakeholders to discuss carbon 
market regulation and general policy issues. 
ISBN 978-94-6138-415-7 
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means – electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or 
otherwise – without the prior permission of CEPS. 
 
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (www.ceps.eu) 
© Centre for European Policy Studies 2014 
Centre for European Policy Studies ▪ Place du Congrès 1 ▪ B-1000 Brussels ▪ Tel: (32.2) 229.39.11 ▪ www.ceps.eu 
The Framework for Various 
Approaches 
and the New Market Mechanism 
Andrei Marcu 
No. 90 / October 2014 
 
Abstract 
In its conclusions in June 2014, the 40th session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and 
Technological Advice (SBSTA 40) invited submissions on the Framework for Various 
Approaches (FVA), New Market Mechanism (NMM) and Non Market Approaches (NMA) by 
22 September 2014. 
This document is the submission by the Centre from European Policy Studies (CEPS) in 
response to that invitation, and covers both FVA and NMM. This submission should be seen 
in conjunction with previous work by CEPS in this area, notably submissions to the UNFCCC 
in March 2013and September 2013. 
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1. FVA, NMM and NMA in context 
Why do we think these elements are a significant component of the 2015 agreement? 
The 2015 climate change agreement will ensure that all Parties make contributions to 
combating climate change. However, from an economic- and emissions-profile point of view, 
the world is very different from what it was when the UNFCCC was negotiated in Rio in 1992, 
and from when the Kyoto Protocol (KP) was agreed in Kyoto in 1997.  
In the context of the economic and financial crisis that we experienced over the last few years, 
which for many is not yet over, the issues of growth, competitiveness and equity have strong 
resonance. These issues are also important in the context of sustainable development.  
There are many ways to look at whether this agreement will be successful or not, and many 
criteria to determine whether Parties are willing to sign it. The experience of the KP, with its 
significant absences, cannot be repeated. 
One way to look at these issues is whether Parties will understand two important aspects of 
the agreement, namely: 
 What does everyone promise to do through INDCs? What do the INDCs represent? In 
other words: 
o How do we define what we promise to do? 
o How do others understand what we promise to do? 
o How do we compare the effort required to deliver on the promises? 
 How do we achieve what we promise to do? What are the means available to achieve what 
we promise to do?  
o Domestic reductions: captured through inventories 
o Internationally transferred mitigation credits:  
- Units 
- Mitigation outcomes 
When the efforts are counted at the end of the compliance period, will there be clarity on these 
points? On inventories, there is an established body of knowledge.  
Accounting was also well understood under the KP – how to count, and what to count. In the 
‘new’ post-2020 world, under what sound reasonable assumptions, that may not be the case, 
and it is an issue that needs to be addressed. 
This makes the FVA, and the approaches it covers, important elements of the 2015 agreement. 
Finally, in the context of what gets counted towards compliance in any regulatory regime, we 
must remind ourselves of a fundamental rule of regulation: the regulator, that is the entity that 
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accepts or imposes a commitment, is the only one entitled to decide what type of units are 
good for compliance.  
A mitigation unit (CER, ERU, EUA) has two values: a monetary market value (decided by 
market actors), and a compliance value, which only the regulator can decide. In the case of the 
EU ETS, the EU, and not the COP, decides that a CER is a worth a ton. In the case of the 2015 
agreement, the ‘regulator’ is the COP. 
1.1 Assumptions 
The role, scope, functions etc. of the FVA/NMM/NMA are going to be dependent on the 
architecture of the 2015 agreement. A ‘loose’ less centralised architecture will require fewer 
functions; a more centralised one may come close to mimicking the KP provisions. 
The KP provisions, which triggered the rapid development and expansion of the carbon 
market, were relatively limited. They included: 
 Articles 3.10 to 3.12, which provide the ‘hook’, the recognition to transfer units and have 
them counted for compliance with KP obligations 
 Article 6, 12 and 17 which allowed 
o For the creation and transfer of unit in non-capped countries (non-Annex 1) 
o The transfer of units under the cap, for countries that had budgets, that is an absolute cap  
The 2015 agreement is just beginning to take shape through the papers that the co- chairs have 
put out, but there is still a long way to go before Paris. A discussion on FVA, NMM and NMA 
therefore requires some assumptions to underpin that discussion. 
 There will be an international climate change agreement 
 Through INDCs all Parties will have to contribute to combating the danger of climate 
change 
 International transfers of mitigation outcomes will be recognized and sanctioned – a 
provision similar to Art 310- to 3.12 of KP 
 Different types of mitigation instruments/approaches/market mechanisms will be 
available and used 
o Developed, created and operated COP (e.g. CDM, JI). So far they have been baseline and 
credit mechanisms 
o Created and operated by Parties (or not by the COP) – e.g. EU ETS, California ETS, China 
Pilot systems, JCM, VCS, Gold Standard). These could be cap-and-trade or baseline-and-
credit. 
 There will be different types of mitigation commitments under INDCs (this list is not 
meant to be exhaustive, it simply focuses on what is relevant to the topic at hand) 
o Economy-wide with absolute caps (not dissimilar to KP commitments, but without AAU 
budget) 
o Subnational level with absolute caps (e.g. sectors of the economy, subnational regions) 
o No absolute caps 
1.2 International transfer today 
Most of the international transfers to date have taken place in the context of the carbon markets 
that have evolved in the KP, or in efforts to address KP compliance. It could, however, be 
argued that some of the voluntary, non-compliance transactions have been driven by many 
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factors, and where markets may not have been the sole driver in concluding a transaction. 
Some of the early REDD transactions would fall into this category, as would others in the 
voluntary market. 
With the development of the California and Quebec ETS, and their link, we will start to see 
international transfers of units that are outside the KP. The same will be true when it comes to 
the JCM, which Japan is currently operationalizing. The link between Australia and the EU, 
which would have been a major event, was cancelled due to the political decision by the new 
Australian government not to pursue carbon pricing as an approach to mitigation. 
As such, the world of international transfers of mitigation outcomes is rapidly changing to a 
much more heterogeneous one, from one where the CDM mechanisms (Art 17 for AAUs, CDM 
and JI) had a quasi-monopoly. 
2. Framework for Various Approaches 
2.1 FVA: Definition, Functions, Scope, and Governance  
Definition  
The FVA is a set of rules, components, standards and protocols that together make up a 
framework (FVA) to ensure that all internationally transferred mitigation units/outcomes 
used for international compliance (with obligations under the UNFCCC) maintain the 
environmental integrity of the global climate change agreement. 
The FVA is not concerned with activities that are purely of a domestic nature, and do not lead 
to international transfers of units or outcomes. As such, for illustration purposes, any ETS that 
is strictly domestic, that is, does not export units that another jurisdiction will later use to 
comply with UNFCCC obligations, is not under the remit of the FVA. 
Another way of looking at the FVA is to say that it will ensure that all units resulting from 
mitigation approaches that meet certain conditions, and that are transferred internationally, 
can be used, and counted, for international compliance with UNFCCC obligations. What those 
conditions are, and how the UNFCCC will test for them, are the topic of another discussion, 
as one of the functions of the FVA. 
As mentioned above, as the ‘orderly and Cartesian’ world of the KP makes room for a more 
heterogeneous one, in order to maintain the integrity of the agreement there must be a 
framework that will provide a common approach on what to count, on how to count it, 
towards compliance. 
There is a significant lesson that we must take from UNFCCC negotiations in general and from 
the history of the KP mechanisms. The temptation to burden the FVA with every provision 
that Parties wish to make risks turning the discussion into a version of the UNFCCC 
negotiations and must be resisted. 
It must be understood that the FVA has an inclusiveness role. The FVA must not be confused 
with the approaches that it aims to integrate under the UNFCCC.  The FVA does not produce 
any reductions itself, and as such, while demand is an important function of the level of 
ambition, it is not relevant to discuss it in the context of the FVA.  
Functions 
In order for the FVA to achieve the objectives outlined in the definition above it will need to 
fulfil at least some of the functions outlined below: 
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1. Provide information for compliance accounting. The accounting system will be central to the 
2015 agreement and the FVA is the part of the agreement that is expected to provide the 
information that will ensure its functioning. 
2. Define protocols and mechanisms to avoid double-counting at 
 Issuance 
 Compliance 
3. Define rules to  
a. Identify what gets counted and under what conditions it gets counted. That is, under what 
conditions do units/outcomes that are transferred internationally and used by a 
jurisdiction other than the one where they were produced get counted toward 
UNFCCC compliance 
b. Decide on the mitigation value assigned to outcomes/units issued? In the KP, that value was 
assigned by the UNFCCC, as all units used for international compliance were issued 
centrally. In the case of the CDM, it was 1 if the project was deemed to be additional. 
In the new, decentralised and heterogeneous world that is no longer very clear, as units 
can now be issued by many jurisdictions. Different approaches have been discussed, 
including the concept of risk-adjusted value, which is somewhere between 1 and 0. 
4. Ensure that net mitigation is achieved. This is not a well-understood concept that has been 
adopted in the UNFCCC language in the drive to move away from ‘offsetting’. A 
distinction must be made between a ‘baseline and credit’ mechanism that produces 
mitigation outcomes (e.g. CDM), and offsetting, which is how the mitigation outcome is 
used. In the KP, it was used to offset reductions in Annex 1 Parties. Let’s stay away for 
shortcuts. 
Scope 
It is generally accepted that the FVA is under the authority of the COP. It is important to fix 
the scope of the FVA, as this will also allow further definition of its elements and relationship 
with existing and future mitigation approaches. Figure 1, below, outlines the view that has 
been expressed by CEPS in previous submissions to the UNFCCC, starting in 2012. In this way 
the FVA can be seen as an ‘umbrella’ for all mitigation approaches that are transferred 
internationally. 
Figure 1. Scope of the FVA 
 
SCM – Sectoral Crediting Mechanism. 
BOCM – Japan Bilateral Offset Mechanism. 
STM – Sectoral Trading Mechanism. 
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In addition, it must be emphasised that the FVA will cover developed and developing 
countries. The FVA will also cover all mitigations approaches and all mechanisms, including 
cap and trade and baseline and credit, as well as any other mitigation approaches that may 
emerge in the future. In this way the FVA must be conceived as flexible and resilient, and able 
to adapt to new approaches that will undoubtedly emerge over time. 
The current international transfer of mitigation units has been south-to-north (CDM), and east-
to-west (JI and AAUs). It can be expected that there will be a flow of mitigation 
outcomes/units south-to-south, and north-to-south. There is a need to adjust and move away 
from conceptualizing flows only as those that aided offsetting under KP, and understand that 
FVA will need to be able to accommodate flows in many directions. While it is true that some 
of these flows may not happen right away, it is nevertheless important to ensure that these 
possibilities are covered in the design and operational specifications of the FVA. 
Governance 
A fundamental principle of the FVA should be that all activities that can be effectively 
regulated at a level other than the international one should be regulated at that level. Only 
those activities, which, if not regulated internationally, would affect the integrity of the 
international climate change regime, should be regulated internationally.  
The FVA, like any other components of the UNFCCC, should operate under the authority of 
the COP. The wording from Doha is constructively ambiguous “considers that any such 
framework will be developed under the authority and guidance of the COP”.   
Given the scope and purpose outlined above, the FVA needs to be part of the post-2020 
agreement, which is under the Convention. As such, it is imperative that the FVA discussion 
also be integrated into the ADP track of negotiations. 
The notion of the FVA being under the Convention automatically brings with it the principles 
of the Convention, etc. This needs to be well understood and applied judiciously, and not in a 
doctrinaire fashion.  
The FVA will have to assess only certain aspects of the institutional arrangements related to 
international mitigation transfers. We must remind ourselves that the FVA should only 
concern itself with units that cross international borders and address and regulate matters that 
need to be regulated internationally, in order to ensure environmental integrity, including 
maintaining an accurate and robust accounting system. 
As such, the FVA will involve itself in ensuring that ‘a ton is a ton’ (MRV, issuance, etc.), but 
should not involve itself in decisions such as whether the allocation in a domestic cap and 
trade is made through auctioning or not. That is a decision that will not impact the 
international climate change regime. 
Consequently, only certain aspects of various approaches will be regulated globally, with 
many, such as the default option, regulated nationally. 
It can be expected that the following aspects may be part of the international set of rules and 
governance. It must be emphasized that this is not an exhaustive rule: 
 Rules and mechanisms for tracking outcome transfers, which will help with compliance 
accounting. For illustration purposes, an ITL and consideration of a UN-run registry, 
available to those Parties that wish to make use of it, are some examples. 
 Set conditions for international transfers to be accounted for international compliance. 
Under what condition are units transferred internationally recognized for UNFCCC 
compliance? 
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 Avoid double counting at usage 
 Conditions for net reduction 
Issues that will be governed at the local level may include 
 Governance of mitigation approaches (e.g. EU ETS governance). Most of the rules for these 
mechanisms/approaches will be set at the local level. However, depending on the type of 
commitment that the Party makes, and type of mechanism, some rules will migrate to the 
global level.  
 Avoid double counting at issuance. The local jurisdiction (e.g. national level) will be the 
one that will have the most information on mitigation activities in that jurisdiction. Local 
authorities are best placed to check issuance for all possible mechanisms that could coexist 
in a jurisdiction, such as a domestic ETS, domestic offsets, CDM, VCS, etc. 
2.2 Accounting under the FVA 
Following up on the CEPS submission of March 2013, in order to set up an accounting system 
for the international transfer of mitigation outcomes/unit, the fundamental principle that has 
to be observed is that of double-entry accounting, which currently also forms the basis of 
accounting under the KP (Articles 3.10 to 3.12). 
Units received by a Party (receiving Party) through an international transfer are credited to 
that Party’s registry, and can be counted at the end of the period for meeting compliance 
obligations. 
On the other side of the ledger, the Party that transfers mitigation units (sending Party) will 
have units debited from its registry and its quantified emission reductions, if it has taken one. 
To operationalise this simple concept two issues need to be resolved: 
a. What gets to be counted? While the principle is simple, based on general accounting 
practices and has a precedent in the KP, what conditions determine what gets to be 
counted? Do the units produced, the systems that produce them, or the jurisdictions where 
they are created, have to meet certain conditions? 
b. How do we determine (test) whether conditions are met? There are different options to 
address these issues. We must remember that we have classified approaches/mechanisms 
as UNFCCC/COP run and created, and as run by Parties, or non-UN bodies. 
1. Outcomes/units from UN-run mechanisms/approaches. These units, the outcome of a 
UNFCCC run and certified process, and issued by the UNFCCC, must, axiomatically, be good 
for compliance with UNFCCC compliance. As such, there are no conditions attached to these 
units being counted for compliance. 
2. Outcomes/units resulting from non-UNFCCC run mitigation approaches. In this case, two 
different approaches can be considered for adoption. 
a) Mechanism pre-qualification. A first approach would be to consider the FVA as a set of 
standards/criteria, defined by the COP, which ensure the environmental integrity of what gets 
counted for compliance. This approach has been discussed in detail in the previous CEPS 
submissions to the UNFCCC on this topic. 
In this scenario, ANY and ALL non-UNFCCC-run approaches/mechanisms that wish to have 
units, which circulate internationally, to be usable for compliance with UNFCCC obligations 
(and counted), must go through this qualification process. 
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This is not dissimilar to the current CDM approach, except that what gets qualified are 
mechanisms (ex-ante), and not the units that are issued by these mechanisms (which qualify 
ex post, such as in the case for the CDM). 
This is could lead to a heavily centralised system, but is likely to be seen as having very strong 
environmental credibility. 
At the same time, it is likely to be overly bureaucratic, with high transaction costs, if the CDM 
is any guide. Also important is the fact that it may also break the principle enunciated above, 
and unnecessarily act in cases where an intervention is not needed at the global level. 
As discussed in previous CEPS submissions, the process for system qualification can range 
from a simple ‘transparency approach’ (through a declaration), to an ‘approval’ process (the 
system is tested against the standards by a central regulatory body). 
b) Party pre-qualification. A second approach is to qualify sending Parties for international 
transfers, based on a set of criteria determined by the COP. In this case, Parties are assessed ex 
ante.  
Depending on the type of commitment that the Party has undertaken, it may have to be 
subjected to an increased level of UNFCCC oversight to ensure that the environmental risk to 
the international system is minimised. 
Parties that pre-qualify. If a Party meets a set of criteria, similar to those outlined for 
participation in Article 17 of the KP, the units that they ‘export’ would be deemed ‘good to be 
counted’. In this case no further international oversight would be required (apart from 
tracking) for the units sent internationally by that Party. 
One way to explain this would be that the Party, having an absolute quantified commitment, 
takes the risk for the environmental value of the units/outcomes it exports.  
This may be criticised as being similar to JI T1, and is highly dependent on all the Parties 
accepting the INDCs that are part of the 2015 agreement. The ‘hot air’ issue emerged not from 
the process itself, but from the questioning of the reduction causes in Parties with EIT. 
However, one could argue that this is also not dissimilar to the excess EUAs in the EU ETS, 
which are the result of a reduction in economic, and not from mitigation efforts. 
Key criteria that a Party would have to meet to pre-qualify (for illustration purposes), may 
include: 
 Is a Party to the 2015 agreement 
 Has an quantified absolute emission reduction target 
 Has in place an MRV system in line with UNFCCC specifications 
 Has submitted a most recent inventory 
 Etc. 
Parties that do not pre-qualify. In the case of Parties that do not fulfil all the conditions set by 
the COP and outlined above, in order for units transferred internationally to be counted for 
UNFCCC compliance they would have to be subjected to international oversight. 
This international oversight could be ex-ante (qualifying mechanisms) or ex-post (qualifying 
units issued, as was the case for the CDM). 
The international oversight may be set at different levels, if some conditions, but not all, are 
met by a Party.  
The oversight would occur in areas that impact environmental integrity such as baseline 
setting, accreditation of verifiers, MRV systems, additionality criteria, public participation, etc. 
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One important aspect of the Party pre-qualification approach is that it may provide incentives 
for Parties to take increasingly stringent commitments, which would provide them with an 
easier access to international carbon markets. 
2.3 Tracking and double-counting 
Tracking of units under the KP is currently done through the ITL, which ‘knows’ the 
whereabouts of every unit issued by the KP that is valid for compliance with KP obligations. 
That is made simpler because only units issued by the UNFCCC, with unique serial numbers, 
are good for compliance with the obligations under the KP. 
Based on the assumptions made the situation will be radically different under the 2015 
agreement. As such, while respecting the principle of doing what is possible at the local level, 
what are the components and protocols that are needed to ensure that we avoid double-
counting, at issuance, and at usage for compliance? 
Since a number of approaches can theoretically co-exist in any jurisdiction (CDM, VCS, NMM, 
domestic ETS), the local regulator is the most appropriate body to ensure that there is no 
double-counting at issuance. It will have to work with the various approaches in order to have 
access to the information that is needed to discharge that responsibility. 
To ensure that there is no double-counting when units are used for compliance, the units 
transferred need to be tracked. This tracking is currently done though a central system that 
manages all transfers between national registries of KP Parties, the ITL. It is a system that has 
worked since the start of the KP.  
However, it must be noted that transfers inside the EU ETS are managed by the EUTL 
(European Union Transaction Log). This ensured that what is essentially a domestic trading 
system (the EU ETS) is not subject to any restrictions or conditions at the UNFCCC level. 
However, the UNFCCC-run ITL also registers transfers between Parties to the KP. 
The 2015 agreement could continue to use the same approach and maintain the ITL as the 
facility that will make the transfers and keep track of international transfers. This would be 
easy to rationalise because “if it isn’t broken, don’t fix it”. 
However, there is reluctance to allow a UNFCCC-run facility to have control over what are 
expected to be, in many cases, bilateral linkages between different countries/Parties.  
Another approach that is proposed is that transfers be done at the bilateral level, and only 
netting (the net amount transferred between countries) be reported at the end of the year to 
the ITL. 
This would ensure that transfers are done by the countries that are linked to each other, but 
that information that would prevent double-counting is available at the UNFCCC level. 
In order to ensure that a market emerges, what is important is that the transfer system is 
reliable. This can be done with, or without, the ITL being a hub. However, it must also be also 
recognised that a linked system is only as strong as its weakest link, both in terms of reliability 
and security. This has led to an increasingly centralised system of national registries in the EU 
ETS. Increased cost could also be a factor, as different systems could link, but the further 
expansion of the system could be hindered by different standards that emerge in different 
clusters. 
Transparency of information for regulation could be ensured, but with reduced effectiveness 
and efficiency, as ex post reporting formats, type of information, etc. may be different from 
system to system. 
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One final issue that merits a mention is that of national registries, which all Parties engaged in 
international transfers will need to have because units will no longer be issued exclusively in 
a centralised way, as it currently is the case under the KP. 
Consideration should be given to the availability of a UNFCCC-run registry that would be 
available to those Parties that may not wish to develop and operate their own, and may wish 
to use this UNFCCC-run facility. 
In the same spirit, use of the ITL or its successor as a transfer and tracking platform may also 
be made available to those Parties that wish to use this option, instead of operating their own 
facility. 
2.4 Net Reduction 
Net reduction is a term that has gained traction in the debate on carbon markets and carbon 
accounting, and was included in UNFCCC agreed texts in Doha and Warsaw. 
However, we feel that this is not a term that has been defined or is well understood. There is 
certainly no common or agreed understanding among Parties and stakeholders on what the 
term means. 
It is a reaction to offsetting, which is the way that units issued from CDM and JI are used in 
the KP. CDM is referred to as an offsetting mechanism. This is not only incorrect, but also 
misleading. 
The CDM is a baseline and credit mechanism that has as output units reduced from a baseline 
(CERs), on a project–by-project basis. The way CERs are used under the KP are as offsets – one 
unit reduced in an Annex 1 country offsets one unit in an Annex 1 country. 
As such offsetting refers not to the mechanisms but to the way in which units transferred are 
used. 
As such, an alternative definition of net mitigation would be that units issued in one 
jurisdiction (especially from a baseline and credit mechanism in a jurisdiction that does not 
have an absolute cap) cannot be used as ‘one-for-one’ to offset emissions in another jurisdiction, 
which uses them for international compliance. 
Different ways of producing net mitigation have been proposed. They focus on ensuring 
conservativeness in the definition of the baseline and issuing few units than would be the case 
in a business as usual (BAU) baseline. 
While this is possible, we believe that this is not the best way forward. Calculation of crediting 
is an imprecise art that already has enough controversy and approximations associated with 
it. Since we can expect a large variety of mitigation approaches, getting the same degree of 
conservativeness in all these approaches will only lead to further controversy, as well as an 
additional level of imprecision, piled upon the already existing one. 
In addition, mitigation units or outcomes will be produced, but an initial lack of clarity is likely 
about whether they will be used for domestic or export purposes. 
As such, a better route is to use the best estimation possible for the crediting of mitigation 
efforts. In order to achieve net mitigation, a discount should be put in place at usage for 
compliance, depending on who uses these credits for compliance – if it is the Party that has 
produced them, then there is no discount; if it another Party, then a discount will apply. 
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3. New Market Mechanism 
The NMM has been created and there is an expectation that modalities and procedures will be 
produced through the SBSTA process. 
It is unclear what the NMM really is, but the consensus seems to emerge that the NMM are 
mechanisms that are operated by the UNFCCC. The existing CDM and JI would fall in that 
category. 
In our view, the NMM may have more than one window, such as a project and a sectoral 
baseline and credit approach. It may also have a REDD+ mechanisms window. 
The purpose of the NMM would be to be available to those Parties that wish to use them in 
their jurisdiction. They may wish to use the NMM windows for a variety of reasons, including 
not wishing to develop their own, not having the capacity to develop and operate their own 
or, the desire of off takers of the mitigation outcome to have them result from a UNFCCC 
instrument, which they may see as having high integrity. 
It is clear that the best and simplest option is for the use of the NMM to be on a voluntary basis, 
while being available to all Parties that sign the 2015 agreement. 
The Modalities and Procedures (M&P) for NMM may have to be at two levels: a fairly high-
level set of M&P that will provide the general governance and process, and a much more 
detailed level, such as that provided by the Marrakech Accords for the CDM. 
The CDM, as well as JI, have accumulated much experience and knowledge in recent years. 
This cannot go to waste and needs to be incorporated into the new 2015 agreement and put to 
good use. In the end the CDM is a process to produce and issue credits from a project-by-
project baseline and credit approach. Such an approach will need to be in the 2015 agreement 
for those Parties that wish to use it. 
As such, the best outcome would be that post-2020, an International Crediting Mechanism be 
incorporated in the NMM, with a project-by-project window, and a sectoral window.  
The CDM, and all its M&P, improved and simplified where agreed by Parties, should migrate 
to the NMM and be merged into that new instrument. 
Whether other windows, or approaches operated by the COP, need to be developed with their 
M&P, is something that will emerge over time and will depend on the demand for such 
approaches, and on the agreement that Parties to the Paris agreement can reach. 
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• Act as a forum for discussion among all stakeholders in the European policy process, and 
• Provide a regular flow of authoritative publications offering policy analysis and 
recommendations, 
Assets 
• Multidisciplinary, multinational & multicultural research team of knowledgeable analysts, 
• Participation in several research networks, comprising other highly reputable research 
institutes from throughout Europe, to complement and consolidate CEPS’ research expertise 
and to extend its outreach,  
• An extensive membership base of some 132 Corporate Members and 118 Institutional 
Members, which provide expertise and practical experience and act as a sounding board for 
the feasibility of CEPS policy proposals. 
Programme Structure 
In-house Research Programmes 
Economic and Social Welfare Policies 
Financial Institutions and Markets 
Energy and Climate Change 
EU Foreign, Security and Neighbourhood Policy 
Justice and Home Affairs 
Politics and Institutions 
Regulatory Affairs 
Agricultural and Rural Policy 
Independent Research Institutes managed by CEPS 
European Capital Markets Institute (ECMI) 
European Credit Research Institute (ECRI) 
Research Networks organised by CEPS 
European Climate Platform (ECP) 
European Network for Better Regulation (ENBR) 
European Network of Economic Policy 
Research Institutes (ENEPRI) 
European Policy Institutes Network (EPIN) 
 
